Vertical contracts in branded-networks;
Sector-based explanations for the French case

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Abstract:
Based on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail trade and services, this paper highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. Until now this issue has not been studied in the economical literature. This paper provides an analytical framework derived from the theory of contracts, and evidence for the French case.

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